THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: AZERBAIJANI KHANATES AND GEORGIA IN 1799

Azerbaijani Khanates and Georgia: Map of the Caucasian Boundaries in 1799

Map and Boundaries of the Caucasian Region in 1799, Legend in Russian.
Military-Historical Department, Staff of the Caucasian Military District, Russia's Imperial Army, Tiflis, 1899; high resolution available at:  http://www.runivers.ru/bookreader/book433217/#page/393/mode/1up 

THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: OBAMA'S RUSSIA "RESET" AND PUTIN'S DOCTRINE

by Mahir Khalifazadeh, Ph.D,* 

Posted from:

CESRAN.org | Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis, London, United Kingdom

27 July 2014 | Russia and Eurasia - Analyses  

Online version available at:

https://cesran.org/the-south-caucasus-obamas-russia-reset-and-putins-doctrine.html

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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371988049_THE_SOUTH_CAUCASUS_OBAMA'S_RUSSIA_'RESET'_AND_PUTIN'S_DOCTRINE

ABSTRACT

The article reviews the key priorities of President Obama’s ‘reset’ policy with Russia. The author analyzes the impact of the ‘reset’ policy on the South Caucasus. The region’s strategic importance is emphasized for U.S. policy towards the Great Middle East and the post-Soviet space. The author discusses the failure of the “Russia reset” policy in improving America’s interests, particularly in the South Caucasus. The priorities of Putin’s doctrine and the implications of the Crimean crises for the South Caucasus are evaluated as well. The author urges for new U.S. initiatives to enforce peace, international borders, and America’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

INTRODUCTION
Since the collapse of the USSR, the South Caucasus has become an arena for the powerful struggle between the West and Russia. The South Caucasus is of great importance for its geostrategic location and its access to Caspian’s energy resources. Geographically, the region is a land bridge between the Black and Caspian Seas. Its proximity to the Middle East increases the South Caucasus’ importance for both the U.S. and Israelis Middle East policies. The South Caucasus is also a sensitive region of the former Soviet Union space. The large energy resources of the Caspian increase the South Caucasus’ role for Europe’s and Israel’s energy security.

IMMEDIATE POST-SOVIET PERIOD
It is well-known that the South Caucasus always been the focus of U.S. foreign policy toward the USSR. However, since the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the first high-level contacts with leaders of all three South Caucasus states took place when the Secretary of State, James Bakker III, embarked on a historical trip to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Central Asia on February 12, 1992, and to Georgia on May 26, 1992. The trip occurred shortly after the dissolution of the USSR in December of 1991. The visit indicated that the South Caucasus states were of strategic importance for America’s interests in the post-Soviet space. It also generated a clear message that the U.S. has strong intentions to launch active diplomacy towards all three newly emerged countries of the South Caucasus without discrimination. So, despite the strong opposition of the Armenian-American diaspora, the United States opened its Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan without delay in March 1992.

Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly emerged states of the South Caucasus held unbalanced influence on Capitol Hill. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia at the time did not have influential diasporas and bold political experiences to deal with the U.S. Congress and administration. However, thanks to the powerful diaspora, Armenia held more advanced positions in the United States. So Armenia widely explored the diaspora’s network to shift America’s policy to a more pro-Armenian stance in the South Caucasus.

In fact, Congress has excluded Azerbaijan from receiving U.S. governmental assistance under Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act (FSA). Despite strong opposition from the George H.W. Bush administration, the language of Section 907 of the FSA prohibited U.S. government-to-government assistance to Azerbaijan. Capitalizing on temporary advantages, the Armenian-American diaspora tried to put Armenia at the center of America’s regional policy, while pushing Armenia as a key promoter of American interests in the South Caucasus. Strong efforts have also been launched to gain U.S. support for Armenia’s position in its conflict with Azerbaijan over Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh. However, as further political events have shown, the diaspora has miscalculated or overestimated Armenia’s power in promoting U.S. interests in the region. Subsequently, both the diaspora’s and Armenia’s goals began to contradict America’s strategic interests in the South Caucasus and in the Caspian Basin.

AZERBAIJAN’S “CONTRACT OF THE CENTURY” AND AMERICA’S REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT
On September 20, 1994, Azerbaijan signed a production-sharing contract, or “Contract of the Century”, with a consortium of international oil companies (British and American oil giants) to explore oil in Azerbaijan’s sector of the Caspian Sea. The discovery of the Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli oil fields in the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian has significantly energized U.S. policy and diplomacy to transform the region into an important source of non-Middle Eastern energy. Huge Azeri oil and gas reserves have raised an issue of energy transportation routes to bypass Russia. In this light, some experts have emphasized the three main drivers of U.S. foreign policy at that time: the role of energy production to strengthen the sovereignty of the South Caucasus nations; U.S. corporate interests; and the role of Caspian energy resources for global energy security[1].

There is no doubt that the decision of the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev to bring American and British oil giants into the South Caucasus/Caspian affairs was a successful step in his strategy to find a delicate balance in enforcing Azerbaijan’s security and promoting U.S. interests. He and President Shevardnadze of Georgia also attempted to bring Azerbaijan and Georgia into focus in the U.S. policy and while equilibrating Russia’s influence.

Since the Soviet’s disintegration, Azerbaijan has tried to strengthen its national independence and security while liberating lands occupied by Armenia. Azerbaijan needed to contain strong pressure from both Iran and Russia, which provided large-scale assistance to Azerbaijan’s regional rival – Armenia. Trying to stabilize and strengthen Azerbaijan’s independence, the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev oriented the country’s foreign policy towards the West and Israel. Thus the “Contract of the Century” was President Heydar Aliyev’s strategic step to anchor Azerbaijan to the West.

Undoubtedly, the Contract has changed the region’s political landscape. The Contract confirmed Azerbaijan’s strategic characteristics in promoting U.S. interests in the region. The Contract also became a long-term tool to project U.S. power deep into Central Asia. In this way, the Contract opened the “gates” for the West’s direct engagement in the South Caucasus and Caspian Basin’s affairs. As one can emphasize, the Contract was a message to Russia: the West comes back. Given that the British withdrawal from Baku in August 1919, put an end to the West’s presence in the South Caucasus, the West returned once more as a strong and influential actor.

Indeed, the United States, the European Union (EU), as well as Turkey and Israel started to play increasing roles in the South Caucasus’ affairs, which traditionally have been orchestrated by Iran and Russia. The Clinton administration launched, and the Bush administration expanded upon, a package of long-term programs (Partnership for Pease, Silk Road Strategy Act; and later, the Caspian Watch and the EU’s Eastern Partnership), oriented to strengthen the West’s presence, while minimizing both Iranian and Russian influences.

After the tragic events of September 11, the United States significantly expanded its political, military, and security cooperation with the South Caucasus countries, which were enlisted by the United States in its war against terror. All three countries agreed to allow passage through their airspace. On December 16, 2001, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited all three capitals of the South Caucasus countries to consolidate U.S. military ties to a vital region. In Baku, Rumsfeld also announced that “the United States Congress appears within days of waiving sanctions imposed in 1992 under the Freedom Support Act”[2].

By early 2002, the U.S. started a train-and-equip program for the Georgian military. There were also some indications that the U.S. Department of Defense had the intention to establish a military presence in Azerbaijan. In December 2003, in a meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Donald Rumsfeld expressed his interest in establishing the U.S. air base on the Apsheron peninsula[3]; however, Azerbaijan denied this option, so as not to anger Iran and Russia.

Within a couple of years, Azerbaijan and Georgia started to rank amongst NATO’s most reliable and committed partners involved in providing support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The United States has also realized that Azerbaijan and Georgia, unlike Armenia, are crucial countries that can promote America’s interests in the region and beyond. In this context, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), a main export pipeline to pump the Caspian oil to world markets via Georgia, was the next strategic step in involving Azerbaijan and Georgia in strengthening America’s influence. The BTC also became a key element in Israel’s energy security[4]. Finally, the BTC enforced the “Contract of the Century” strategy: to engage the West, while balancing Russia’s influence.

Meanwhile, huge and long-term international projects aimed at pumping and transporting Caspian energy while bypassing Russia have shifted America’s policy towards the region. The South Caucasus became an increasingly important component of U.S. foreign policy. Azerbaijan and Georgia both aligned themselves with the United States and sought integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, while Armenia deepened its ties with Moscow. So, the United States began focusing on Azerbaijan and Georgia in its regional policy and increased its direct assistance to Baku and Tbilisi[5]. Finally, the large energy projects pushed Washington to gain strategic momentum in the Caspian basin, which greatly angered Moscow.

Since the BTC started to operate in 2005, Russia has realized that the United States has been rapidly increasing its operational abilities to limit Russia’s influence. Moscow understood that Washington had become a powerful actor that could seriously jeopardize Moscow’s interests in this sensitive part of the world.

RUSSIA’S RESPONSE: THE WAR WITH GEORGIA
Undoubtedly, Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century” accelerated American economic and political penetration. Washington became a key player, which was directly engaged in tight and complex affairs in the South Caucasus and Caspian basin. The United States, as one can emphasize, has gained considerable momentum in expanding its influence in the region and beyond. This tendency created serious concern in Moscow and Tehran because it puts Russia’s and Iran’s historical dominance under inevitable erosion[6].

Indeed, Russia painfully reacted to America’s rapid “advance” into the region, which Moscow’s decision-makers traditionally considered as a part of Russia’s backyard. Some scholars noted: “…to counter this development, one of Russia’s tactics is to slow down Western advances… ”[7]. In this context, the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 possibly originated from these tactics. Sources confirmed that the plan for Georgia had been prepared by Russia’s Armed Forces General Staff, even from the end of 2006 – to the beginning of 2007[8]; this was quite soon after the BTC started to operate in 2005. Moscow’s goals were clear: stop Russia’s retreat, reverse strategic momentum, and ensure Russia’s interests were protected.

Unfortunately, former Georgian President Saakashvili’s miscalculations gave Russia the chance to strengthen Moscow’s security posture in the region. Moreover, the war with Georgia has provided a brilliant opportunity for Russia to shift the region’s balance of power and regain strategic momentum to enforce Moscow’s influence in its immediate neighborhood. Russia has demonstrated to global and regional powers that the South Caucasus (like the entire CIS) is Russia’s near abroad and Moscow has exclusive rights to use the force and manage the situation following its strategic interests.

As a result, the Georgian and Ukrainian movements towards NATO membership have been abandoned from the agenda. In addition, two parts of Georgia have been recognized by Russia as independent states. Some scholars indicated: “Western actors have in practice been forced to recognize Russia’s military dominance in the region and act only in areas approved by Russia and within the limits set by Russia”[9].

One might interpret that the Georgia war was a message to the West: Russia recovers with its old imperial ambitions, and the Russian military once again serves as a working tool in Moscow’s strategic calculations. “As the Russia-Georgia conflict demonstrates, military force has become a major factor in Russian foreign policy”[10]. Moreover, Russia’s rapid advance deep into Georgia also confirms that Russia can reach both capitals, Baku and Tbilisi (key U.S. partners) easily and that no power can stop Russia’s forces. So, the war has demonstrated that the Western companies’ oil and pipeline infrastructures in the Caspian could be under threat and that the West has no effective tools to stop Russia’s military.

As further political development has indicated, the Georgia war became a turning point in Russia’s foreign and security policy toward the former Soviet republics. There are many indications that the Kremlin has adopted a new strategy: to expand Russia’s military presence in the near abroad, and to increase Moscow’s power to keep former Soviet republics in Russia’s orbit. Moscow has launched a double-track policy: to intensify a military buildup in Russia’s immediate neighborhood and to pressure neighboring countries to join the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union, which must start operating in 2015. In parallel, Russia pushed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russia-dominated post-Soviet security block.

In fact, in 2009, soon after the Georgian war, Russia pressured Kyrgyzstan to close its U.S. military air base Manas[11]. A year later, Russia extended its lease for the military base in Armenia to 2044[12] and offered large amounts of military hardware to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two Central Asian countries that also host Russian military bases[13]. Earlier, Russia signed a deal with Kyrgyzstan to allow Moscow to keep a military base in the country until 2032[14]. Russia also signed a $4 billion military deal with Azerbaijan in 2010[15] and it negotiated plans to open a military air base in Belarus in 2015[16]. Russia increased its military personnel up to 5000 strong, and added combat helicopters to the fighter unit in Armenia[17].

Undoubtedly, the Russo- Georgian war of 2008 was a milestone development in the post-Soviet space. Russia enforced its dominance in the near abroad and increased its efforts to launch the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union. However, the United States was shocked and pushed to adopt a new strategy.

AMERICA’S RESPONSE: ‘RESET’ WITH RUSSIA 
When President Obama took office in 2009, he immediately announced a new foreign policy strategy: to reset relations with Russia. The relations between the United States and post-Soviet Russia were so bad at that time that some observers characterized them as a new Cold War[18]. However, attempts to improve relations with Russia are not unique to the Obama administration. As Paul J. Sanders, Executive Director of the Nixon Center, believes, “… efforts made by previous two administrations included resets that ultimately failed to live up to expectations”[19]. However Dr.James M.Goldgeier of the Hoover Institution emphasizes that the origin of America’s Russia ‘reset’ policy has a root that runs deep to the Clinton-Yeltsin period[20].

Meanwhile, in 2009, the ‘reset’ policy originated by serious disagreements between Washington and Moscow on the Europe-based missile defense system, Iran’s nuclear program, post-Soviet politics, NATO’s eastward expansion, the Georgia war of 2008, and other issues. In this context, the Russo- Georgian war of 2008 was a crucial factor in the South Caucasus’ ‘frontline’ of opposition between the United States and Russia, which pushed the Obama administration to reset its relations with Russia. Political analysts even emphasized that the war in Georgia was a proxy American-Russian war, for the Georgian forces were supplied and trained by Washington.

It is necessary to note that the Obama administration considered this ‘reset’ as an essential step in improving relations and overcoming the sense of distrust. The goal was to replace conflicts with cooperation, or “selective cooperation”, on issues that were at the top of the United States’ priorities. Some commentators, such as Russia specialists Thomas E. Graham of Kissinger Associates and Peter Baker of theNew York Times, believed that Obama’s reset was a “new partnership”[21].

In fact, both President Obama and Russian President Medvedev considered their personal friendship as evidence of the reset’s success. At the 2010 APEC summit in Japan’s Yokohama, President Obama met with Russian President Medvedev in an informal meeting to discuss a wide range of bilateral and global issues. President Obama made statements such as, “my friend Dmitri” and “an excellent partner,” whereas President Medvedev replied with “very pleasant for me” and “we understand each other very well”[22]. So within the ‘reset’ policy, as scholars believe, the United States was able to gain Moscow’s cooperation on some U.S. priorities like the war in Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear-weapons aspirations, New START, and nuclear proliferation[23].

DOUBTS ABOUT OBAMA’S ‘RESET’ WITH RUSSIA 
At the same time, political analysts from both sides of the Atlantic expressed serious doubts about President Obama’s success in improving Russia-United States relations. Some of them accused President Obama’s reset of being a “capitulation” and stated it was a “dangerous bargain” they also regarded it as a policy of “seeing no evil”[24]. They directly criticized the Obama administration for its wrong approach and for the possible “grand bargain” between the United States and Russia as part of the administration’s reset efforts with Russia[25].

David J. Kramer, former deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs in the George W. Bush administration, stated in the Washington Post: “… the administration would pursue a “Russia first” policy at the expense of Russia’s neighbors. The problem, it appears, is actually worse: the administration seems to have moved toward a “Russia only” approach, neglecting and even abandoning other countries in the region”[26].

Dr. Ariel Cohen of the Washington, D.C.-based Heritage Foundation believed that a “Russia first” approach seriously damaged U.S. interests. He strongly argued that Obama’s ‘reset’ policy has failed to improve bilateral relations and that Obama conceded too much to Russia at the expense of American interests. He stated: “… the Kremlin is exploiting Obama’s “see no evil” approach in Russia’s expansion into former Soviet space and cooperation with anti-Western regimes. The Obama administration’s Russia policy will inevitably produce a massive loss of American influence in Eurasia and jeopardize the security of the U.S. and its friends and allies east of the Order”[27].

PUTIN’S DOCTRINE PRACTICE IN THE REGION
There is a well-known statement from President Putin of Russia arguing that the breakup of the USSR was “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”. Since his election in 2000, President Putin tried to recover Russia’s political and geostrategic assets that were lost by the USSR in 1991. President Putin has sought to renew Russia’s status and influence in both regional and global politics while making the Russian Federation a great power again. He has been increasing Russia’s military budget and had tried to frustrate and foil U.S. initiatives which, as he believes, can seriously damage Russian interests. He has also been expanding Russia’s relations with countries, that share anti-American politics, and he tries to exploit diplomatic friction between the U.S. and its allies. President Putin’s attempt to restore Russia’s sphere of influence and regain its superpower status, as some analysts argue, is Russia’s new foreign policy concept, otherwise known as the Putin Doctrine[28].

The first component of Putin’s foreign policy consensus, as Leon Aron stated in Foreign Affairs, is to maintain Russia as a nuclear superpower[29]. The second pillar is to export nuclear technologies, so, as to enhance Russia’s position as a global power. The third is to recover Russia’s close relations with its former Soviet clients in the Middle East. Next is to ensure Russia’s regional hegemony near abroad and “… to strive for the political, economic, military, and cultural reintegration of the former Soviet bloc under Russian leadership”. Regarding Russia’s efforts to strengthen the Kremlin’s position in the near abroad, Leon Aron also emphasized the following: “Under the Putin Doctrine, the pursuit of regional hegemony has acquired a new dimension: an attempt at the ‘Finlandization’ of the post-Soviet states, harkening back to the Soviet Union’s control over Finland’s foreign policy during the Cold War. In such an arrangement, Moscow would allow its neighbors to choose their own domestic political and economic systems but maintain the final say over their external orientation. Accordingly, Moscow has taken an especially hard line against former Soviet republics that have sought to reorient their foreign policy”.

Meanwhile, the Russian opposition leader and former State Duma First Deputy Vladimir A.Ryzhkov believes that “the doctrine includes Russia’s renunciation of attributing itself to the European and Euro-Atlantic civilization; selective recognition of the norms of international law; selective cooperation with international organizations; and the right to limit the sovereignty of the post-soviet states, as well as to ignore national sovereignty and territorial integrity of weaker states”[30].

In fact, under direct pressure from Moscow, Ukraine’s President Yanukovych did not sign a political association and free trade pact with the European Union, which was scheduled to take place at the Eastern Partnership Summit in November 28-29, 2013 in Vilnius, Lithuania[31]. Armenia was forced to abandon the process of signing the free trade agreement with the European Union as well[32]. Russia has also pressured Armenia to join the Russia-led Customs Union of Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, which is set to transform into the Eurasian Union by 2015[33].

Meanwhile, Russia has been strengthening the Collective Security Treaty Organization of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and it has been increasing its military presence in these countries, except in Kazakhstan. One can emphasize that the unchallenged Russian military’s superiority in Russia’s near abroad is a crucial element of the Putin doctrine, as it can keep former Soviet republics under Moscow’s control while stopping NATO’s eastward expansion. Russia uses its military installations as a tool to force the West to avoid deploying US/NATO troops or troops of any NATO member country into Russia’s immediate neighborhood.

In this way, Russia’s military base in Armenia transforms this country into the so-called Russian “fortress” to ensure Russia’s regional dominance and to prevent NATO’s deployment in the South Caucasus, which holds geostrategic importance for Israel, as a part of the Greater Middle East, as well as for the United States and Europe. The base, thanks to newly deployed Fulcrum fighter jets[34] and attack helicopters[35], has a full set of strategic characteristics that render it a key military installation in the region to project Russia’s military power to the Persian Gulf and deep into the Middle East.

One can emphasize that Russia’s military base in Gyumri (Armenia) and its naval base in Tartus (Syria) are key elements in Putin’s plans to expand Russia’s influence in the Middle East and undermine America’s dominance in the region as well as to shake America’s global role, as Soviets did. In this context, Russia is not interested in the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. If this occurs, there is no doubt it will erode any grounds to keep the base in Armenia.

Moreover, in light of Russia’s recent invasion of Crimea (Ukraine), the Russian military base in Armenia has become a real threat for Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s independence. In 2008, as the Russo-Georgia war started, Georgian President Saakashvili was seriously concerned about the possible invasion of Russian troops from Russia’s military base in Armenia. Russia demands a corridor for its military base in Armenia through Georgia. Russia has also pushed Tbilisi to accept new realities and to recognize South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence as a precondition for which to re-establish the diplomatic ties that were broken after the 2008 war. So, Russia tries to kill Georgia’s NATO and EU ambitions.

In Azerbaijan, Russia has been keeping the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ‘frozen’ and holds the key to unfreeze the conflict at any moment. Moscow has been pressuring Baku to formally desist from using force to return Nagorno-Karabakh under its control. Russia tries to prolong the conflict and maintains the Azeri-Armenian hostility as an effective tool through which to manipulate both Baku and Yerevan to secure Russia’s interests and dominance in the South Caucasus. Recently, Russia has introduced semi-official speculations related to Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh’s membership in the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union[36]. This approach is designed to increase the pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan. So, some Russian political analysts do not exclude further cases of territorial “revisions” of both pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan if they escape from Russia’s orbit.

In addition, Russia is increasing efforts to consolidate its influence in the Caspian basin. On April 22, 2014, during a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Caspian Sea’s littoral states – Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan – in Moscow, Russia (together with Iran) has cautioned against the military presence of any non-littoral states in the Caspian Sea[37].

CRIMEA CRISIS: THE END OF ‘RESET’? IMPLICATION FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
Despite sound criticism of the Obama administration’s Russia ‘reset’ policy, the key goal of the ‘reset’ – to replace conflicts with cooperation – was a correct and strategic goal to try to re-normalize relations with post-Soviet Russia. Within the ‘reset’ policy, the United States has gained Russia’s support on some of the key priorities of America’s foreign policy, such as on Iran and Afghanistan. However, the United States canceled the planned deployment of missile interceptors and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic. The United States postponed offering the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine. Later, Washington started to send signals to Tbilisi to improve its relations with Moscow, which were seriously damaged after the Russo-Georgia war of 2008.

Meanwhile, there are some indications that the Russian political elite interpreted President Obama’s ‘reset’ policy as a sign of American weakness[38]. The decade-long American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have fully exhausted the U.S. military machine and pushed the Pentagon to abandon its two-war doctrine requesting America’s military to fight two simultaneous conventional wars[39]. The Pentagon’s move to reject the concept of winning two wars has generated serious speculation that America’s global power is in decline. Thus, the significant shift in America’s foreign policy, presented by Obama’s ‘reset’ initiative, as well as the fact that the new U.S. military doctrine focused on China not on Russia[40], sent a wrong message to Moscow pushing the Kremlin to energize its newly adopted foreign policy concept, the Putin doctrine. In addition, President Obama’s policy of non-intervention in Syria as well as Pentagon plans to shrink the U.S. Army to pre-World War II level[41], probably, reassured Moscow that the United States is not interested in serving as a global arbiter. “The Russian elite interpreted the reset as weakness on the part of the Obama administration and as an invitation to be more assertive in the post-Soviet space and beyond.”[42]. In this context, as one might interpret, the Crimean crisis is the Kremlin’s powerful message to the world powers: Russia has a strong intention to restore its non-Red Empire and retake its superpower status. And Russia’s Crimean ‘anschluss’ provides an example of the Putin doctrine in practice, which is a clear sign of the threat to the post-Soviet states.

In fact, on February 11, 2014, Russia started a large-scale military exercise in Armenia[43]; moreover, beginning March 15, 2014, a group of Russia’s Caspian Flotilla ships, including landing boats have launched two week-long exercises in the Caspian Sea[44]. In February 2014, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Vice-Chairman of the Russian State Duma and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), called for Russia to annex five entire countries – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan – as Russia’s “Central Asian Federal Region”[45]. He also called to occupy Georgia and used offensive and humiliating words and phrases to refer to Azerbaijan and Ukraine[46].

Sergey Fedunyak, an expert at Kennan Institute, believes that “there is an increasing risk of the use of force by Russia against its neighboring countries, particularly, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. In the first three cases, it may develop into hostilities of different intensity ranging from classical war with armed forces to “hybrid wars” with a high autonomy of soldiers and subversive small units. Georgia has already suffered from, and Ukraine has begun to experience, Russia’s new approaches to war. In the cases of Kazakhstan and Belarus, there may be a “mild” annexation of a part of a territory or complete absorption that may be facilitated with populations’ psychological and military unpreparedness to resist Russian occupation”[47].

As one can emphasize, Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (Ukraine) is a failure of President Obama’s Russia ‘reset’ policy. The failure of the ‘reset’ policy generates long-term implications for U.S. foreign and security policy. Dr.Condoleezza Rice, former U.S. secretary of state, emphasizes: “Most important, the United States must restore its standing in the international community, which has been eroded by too many extended hands of friendship to our adversaries, sometimes at the expense of our friends”[48].

Indeed, in the South Caucasus, the United States and NATO have to reassure their full support for independence, as well as for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are America’s allies, implementing pro-Western foreign policy that anger Moscow. There is no doubt that Russia will consistently follow the policy to undermine the West’s influence and to pressure America’s friends in the region.

Since President Putin’s annexation of Crimea, no one can exclude the idea that Moscow may select Azerbaijan and/or Georgia as its next targets for Russia’s plan to protect Russians and Russian speakers. The Russians will continue its efforts to incorporate both Azerbaijan and Georgia into the so-called “Russian world”. If Russia regains Azerbaijan and/or Georgia, it will re-establish Russia’s full control over the Caspian energy reserves and energy transportation routes jeopardizing America’s interests and multi-billion dollar oil investments. Also, it will put an end to the West’s new strategic plans to expand the Southern Corridor to bring Caspian gas to Europe and so to decrease Europe’s dependence on Russia’s gas.

Meanwhile, European leaders recently agreed to step up their moves to cut energy dependency, notably on Russia, after the events in Ukraine. British Foreign Secretary William Hague expressed an idea to increase gas exports to Europe and to support projects such as the Southern Corridor pipeline in Baku, Azerbaijan, which will bring Caspian natural gas to Europe, bypassing Russia[49].

In this context, the involvement of Turkmenistan in the Southern Corridor is strongly essential for the strategy to try to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russia’s gas. The project of a Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea needs to be on the table again to bring Turkmenistan’s gas to the European Union via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) projects. Piping Turkmen gas to Europe should be the next logical step in the development of the Southern Corridor. In this light, the first Trilateral Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan in Baku, on 26 May 2014, is an important step in this direction. “The meeting is expected to address the opportunities for developing cooperation at bilateral and regional levels in matters of common interest to all three countries, especially in the fields of energy and transportation, and to enable an exchange of views on international and regional developments”[50]. Earlier, Ankara emphasized the importance of TANAP for the EU’s energy security following Russia’s military intervention in Crimea.

However, there is one problem: the West does not have an effective political or military tool to balance Russia’s military in Armenia. Since the Crimea crisis, the unbalanced and overwhelming Russian military presence in Armenia has created a serious and direct threat to America’s strategic interests and generates security problems for Western-oriented Azerbaijan and Georgia. It is also a threat to Western oil and gas infrastructures and pipelines.

In this context, the triangular cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia offers valuable reasons for the alliance to be transformed into an effective defense tool to enforce peace, stability, and international borders in the South Caucasus. Today’s cooperation addresses politics, security, energy, transportation, trade, and investment, but it should have a military dimension as well. A defense alliance could be created based on the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia triangle to protect Western oil and gas infrastructure, and to enforce Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s independence. The next possible option is to sign Turkey- Azerbaijan and/or Turkey-Georgia bilateral defense agreements to strengthen both Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s defense capabilities. In this light, it is necessary to note that the trilateral cooperation between Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan in the military sphere was discussed during the Tbilisi summit of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey which was held on May 6, 2014. In parallel, as one can emphasize, the United States needs to support Azerbaijani-Georgian military cooperation, which should be expanded upon and transformed into a defense alliance in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the formation of Azeri-Georgian or joint Turkish-Azeri-Georgian peacekeeping battalions could be considered as well. Thus, mentioned above approaches and close cooperation with NATO will improve both Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s defense capabilities. Moreover, these measures may partially balance Russia’s military presence in Armenia as well as to prevent Russia from taking potentially irreversible and aggressive steps against Georgia and Azerbaijan. In fact, people in Azerbaijan and Georgia are very concerned that Russia may move as it did in 1920-1921. At that time, Bolshevik Russia occupied all three countries in the South Caucasus and terminated their short-lived independence.

Unfortunately, one negative aspect of the ‘reset’ policy was that the U.S. has decreased its attention as well as its involvement with the South Caucasus. As a result, the ‘reset’ policy has failed to improve the political atmosphere and to solve ‘frozen’ conflicts in the South Caucasus. Thus, there is no peace along the pipelines that are pumping Caspian energy to Europe. Moreover, there are indications that the region’s political situation has deteriorated and America’s strategic interests are now under threat.

Indeed, Russia has been strengthening its influence and it has considered cementing its position in the region of paramount importance; it has also tried to secure its interests at any cost. Russia has pushed America to retreat; and it has increased its pressure on Azerbaijan and Georgia, which are America’s real friends. On March 27, 2014, only two countries – Azerbaijan and Georgia- from the list of South Caucasus and Central Asian states openly supported the U.S.-backed UN resolution on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and deemed the referendum that led to Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula illegal.

CONCLUSION

 After Ukraine, what is President Putin’s next target? This is an alarming question. The collapse of both Azerbaijan and Georgia, as independent states, will have irreversible consequences on the whole post-Soviet space. The unstable Central Asian states also may become the next target for Russia. Russian hardliners like the Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma and leader of the LDPR VladimirZhirinovsky already began urging to protect Russians in Kazakhstan and in other Central Asia states.

President Putin’s statement that Russia has the right to protect Russians and Russian-speakers outside of Russia’s borders is a critical update for the Putin doctrine. This update opens a ‘door’ for the Russian military to intervene in the post-Soviet space, as well as in the Central and Eastern Europe[51]. Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea challenges the post-Cold War order and America’s role as a global arbiter. It also provokes NATO’s defense strategies and challenges the vision that Europe is whole and free.

The United States needs to abandon the ‘reset’ policy. It has been exhausted and has failed to protect and advance U.S. interests. Moreover, President Obama’s ‘reset’ policy made America look weak, likely resulting in, President Putin’s miscalculations of America’s global responsibility and investment in foreign policy goals. The United States needs to reaffirm its commitments to its allies in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as increase its own engagement in the South Caucasus and Central Asia[52].

In this context, the United States should launch a new assistance program to replace the old and out-of-date Freedom Support Act (FSA) of 1992, which already does not reflect the new realities in the post-Soviet space. Unlike the FSA, which mainly concentrates on Russia, the new strategic program must be focused on Russia’s immediate neighbors to support their independence, territorial integrity, defense, and economic capabilities. Since the Crimean crisis, Russia does not need America’s assistance any longer.

The United States and the European Union have to increase their direct assistance to the countries of the former Soviet Union. Regarding the South Caucasus, the United States needs to be re-engaged in the region’s affairs, and it also needs to develop a strategy aimed at strengthening the region’s links with Europe. In parallel, the European Union needs to update the Eastern Partnership program, and NATO has to update and expand upon the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with Azerbaijan for 2015-2016. Meanwhile, Georgia should offer a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the September 2014 NATO summit in Wales.

There is no doubt that the doors of NATO and the EU must be open to new members. In parallel, Dr. George Friedman (Chairman of Stratfor, a US-based geopolitical intelligence firm) argues that containment alliances from Estonia to Azerbaijan should be created to enforce the independence of the former Soviet republics and to stop Putin’s Russia[53].

Lastly, French President Francois Hollande’s three-day (May 11-13, 2014)visit the South Caucasus, as well as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s intention to visit Azerbaijan and Georgia[54] and announced plans related to a new Southern Gas Corridor (led by BP, which will bring Caspian gas to Europe[55]) create an understanding that the West and, particularly, the United States will enforce its presence and influence. It also reassures Washington’s intention to oppose to Russia’s imperial ambitions in this sensitive part of the world. If the United States forgets the South Caucasus countries, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia (as Obama’s ‘reset’ policy creates such trend), and leaves them face-to-face with Russia’s military machine (as Britain did in 1919), there is no doubt Russia will “re-Sovietize” them again and the West will pay a huge price for such a wrong policy.

In December 2012, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that the U.S. was trying to prevent Russia from recreating a new version of the Soviet Union. Thus, now is the time for America to abandon the ‘reset’ policy with Russia and to demonstrate America’s global power to enforce peace, stability, and international borders. However, such a policy will likely not be established under President Obama’s administration, which has invested a lot of political capital to reset its relations with Russia; rather this may be undertaken for the next U.S. administration.

NOTES

* Dr Mahir Khalifazadeh is a political analyst based in Toronto (Canada). He is affiliated with the Montreal-based Center for Research on Globalization and is a member of the Canadian Political Science Association. He is also a Professor of Political Science at the Baku-based International Ecoenergy Academy (Azerbaijan) and a regular contributor to international journals on global politics and security. His latest article is “Israeli-Azerbaijani Alliance and Iran” (CLORIA CENTER, MERIA, Israel, 2013).

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[3] Bradley Graham, “Rumsfeld discuss Tighter Ties with Azerbaijan,” Washington Post, December 4, 2003, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-311304.html

[4] Mahir Khalifa-zadeh, “Israeli-Azerbaijani Alliance and Iran,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA),Vol. 17, No. 1, (Spring 2013), http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/03/israeli-azerbaijani-alliance-and-iran

[5] US Department of State, “U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia: Fact Sheets and Remarks,” http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ace/c11609.htm

[6] Mahir Khalifa-zadeh, “Iran and the South Caucasus: A Struggle for Influence,” Journal of Central Asia and Caucasus, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2011), http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2011-01-eng/05.shtml.

[7]Marcel de Haas, “Current Geostrategy in the South Caucasus,” Eurasianet.org, January 06, 2007, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010707.shtml

[8] “Russian Generals Accuse Medvedev of Hesitation in Russia-Georgia War,” Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, August 08, 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-says-russia-had-plans-for-georgian-aggression-in-late-2006/24670673.html

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[18]Stephen F.Cohen, “The New American Cold War,” The Nation, July 10, 2010, http://www.thenation.com/article/new-american-cold-war

[19]Dr Paul J.Sanders, “The U.S.-Russia Reset: Status and Prospects,” Kennan Institute, January 10, 2011, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-us-russia-reset-status-and-prospects

[20]James Mi.Goldgeiger, “A Realistic Reset with Russia,” Hoover Institution, Policy Review, No. 156, August 3, 2009, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/5474

[21]Stephen F.Cohen, “Obama’s Russia ‘Reset’: Another Lost Opportunity?” The Nation, June 20, 2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/161063/obamas-russia-reset-another-lost-opportunity#

[22]Cohen, “Obama’s Russia ‘Reset’: Another Lost Opportunity?”

[23]Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Obama Calls Arms Treaty a Priority,” The New York Times, November 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/world/europe/14diplo.html?ref=us

[24]Marina Aristova, “US-Russia Relations of Reset: Results and Perspectives,” Research Institute of European and American Studies, November 02, 2013, http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/russian-studies/2048-us-russia-relations-of-reset-results-and-perspectives.html

[25]Frank Gaffney, “‘Reset’ Translates As ‘Capitulation’,” Center for Security Policy, September 17, 2009, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2009/09/17/reset-translates-as-capitulation-2/

[26]David Kramer, “U.S. Abandoning Russia’s Neighbors,” The Washington Post, May 15, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/14/AR2010051404496.html

[27]Ariel Cohen, “Time to Revise Obama’s Russian “Reset” Policy”, The Heritage Foundation, WebMemo, No. 3042, October 26, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/10/time-to-revise-obamas-russian-reset-policy

[28]Ilai Saltzman, “The Putin Doctrine,” Los Angeles Time, September 12, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/12/opinion/la-oe-saltzman-syria-putin-doctrine-20130912

[29]Leon Aron, “The Putin Doctrine: Russia’s Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State,” Foreign Affairs, March 8, 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine

[30]Sergiy Fedunyak, “Putin’s Doctrine” as a threat to the International System,” Kennan Institute, May 20, 2014, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/%E2%80%9Cputin%E2%80%99s-doctrine%E2%80%9D-threat-to-the-international-system

[31]Neil Buckley and Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine refuses to sign up to Europe deal,” Financial Times November 29, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a1380b2-58de-11e3-9798-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zj0nOWdC

[32]“EU loses Armenia to Russia’s Customs Union,” EurActive.com, September 4, 2013, http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/eu-loses-armenia-russia-customs-news-530224

[33]“Armenia signs Customs Union roadmap, Kyrgyzstan needs more talks,” Russia Today, December 24, 2013, http://rt.com/business/kyrgyzstan-armenia-customs-union-749/

[34] “Russia Reinforces Armenian Base With Overhauled MiG-29 Fighter Jets,” RIA Novosti, March 4, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140305/188092268/Russia-Reinforces-Armenian-Base-With-Overhauled-MiG-29-Fighter.html

[35] “Russia Forms Helicopter Squadron for Armenian Base,” RIA Novosti, January 17, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20140117/186629314.html

[36] “Does the Eurasian Union Have a Separatist Problem?,” Eurasianet.org, June 05, 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68441

[37] “Caspian states agree to prevent foreign presence: Iran FM,” PressTv, April 23, 2014, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/04/23/359731/no-foreign-presence-in-caspian-sea/

[38] Lilia Shevtsova, “A Second Act for U.S. Foreign Policy,” The American Interest, April 8, 2014, http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/04/08/a-second-act-for-u-s-foreign-policy/

[39] Alex Spillius, “Pentagon abandons two-war doctrine,” The Telegraph, February 2, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7140418/Pentagon-abandons-two-war-doctrine.html

[40] John Cherian, “New Military Doctrine: America is “Looking for Enemies”: Threatening China,” Centre for Research on Globalization, January 29, 2012, http://www.globalresearch.ca/new-military-doctrine-america-is-looking-for-enemies-threatening-china/28943

[41] Thom Shanker and Helene Cooper, “Pentagon Plans to Shrink Army to Pre-World War II Level,” The New York Times, February 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/us/politics/pentagon-plans-to-shrink-army-to-pre-world-war-ii-level.html?_r=0

[42] Lilia Shevtsova, “A Second Act for U.S. Foreign Policy.”

[43] “Russian military exercises start in Armenia,” TREND News Agency, February 11, 2014, http://en.trend.az/regions/scaucasus/armenia/2240666.html

[44] Rashad Suleymanov, “Russian Navy conducting exercises in Caspian Sea,” APA News Agency, March 17, 2014, http://en.apa.az/news/208726

[45] “Kyrgyzstan asks for Explanation of Zhirinovsky comments,” Radio Free Europe, March 19, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyzstan-russia-explanation-zhirinovsky/25276649.html

[46] “Russian politician offends Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians,” TERT News Agency, March 17, 2014, http://www.tert.am/en/news/2014/03/17/zhirinovski-azer/

[47] Fedunyak, “Putin’s Doctrine as a Threat to the International System”.

[48] Condoleeza Rice, “Will America heed the wake-up call of Ukraine?” Washington Post, March 07, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/condoleezza-rice-will-america-heed-the-wake-up-call-of-ukraine/2014/03/07/cf087f74-a630-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html

[49] Nicholas Winning, “Europe Considering Increasing U.S. Gas Imports, Says U.K.’s Hague,” The Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303795904579428813878337946

[50] “First Trilateral Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan held in Baku,” Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, No. 163, May 25, 2014, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-163_-25-may-2014_-press-release-regarding-the-trilateral-meeting-of-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey_-azerbaijan-and-turkmenistan.en.mfa

[51] Massimo Calabresi, “Inside Putin’s East European Spy Campaign,” Time, May 07, 2014, http://time.com/90752/inside-putins-east-european-spy-campaign/

[52] Andrewa A.Michta, “A Strategy for Eurasia,” The American Interest, April 14, http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/04/14/a-u-s-strategy-for-eurasia/

[53] George Friedman, “From Estonia to Azerbaijan: American Strategy After Ukraine,” Stratfor, March 25, 2014, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/estonia-azerbaijan-american-strategy-after-ukraine

[54] “U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to visit Azerbaijan,” Xinhua, March 18, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2014-03/19/c_133196212.htm

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IRAN AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: A STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE

by Mahir Khalifa-zadeh

24 February, 2017

Posted from:  

Khalifa-zadeh M., "Iran and the South Caucasus: A Struggle For Influence", Central Asia and Caucasus, 2011, Vol 12, Issue 1, 51-62, Stockholm, Sweden.

available at: https://ca-c.org/CAC/index.php/cac/article/view/1796/1597

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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371753860_IRAN_AND_THE_SOUTHERN_CAUCASUS_A_STRUGGLE_FOR_INFLUENCE

Introduction
It is well known that for the dozen centuries, the South Caucasus has had a strategic importance for superpowers that dominated in different historical periods. As a starting point of superpowers’ struggle and a paramount example of their attempts to secure interests in this strategic part of the world, we can recall the Roman Army's advances under the command of General Pompey (66-65 BC) and General Mark Antony (36 BC) to the Caucasus. And in 75 AD, Roman Emperor Domitian sent the legion of XII Fulminata to support the allied kingdoms of Iberia and Albania (modern Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, respectively). A rock inscription found near the shores of the Caspian Sea (Gobustan, approximately 60-70 km from Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan) mentions the presence of Legio XII Fulminata's centurion, named Lucius Julius Maximus (1; 2).

The region’s strategic dimensions

For centuries, the superpowers like the Roman and Persian Empires (3), Caliphate, Persian and Byzantine Empires (4), or Ottoman, Persian and Russian Empires (5, 6) struggled to control the South Caucasus. Undoubtedly, since the time of the Great Silk Way, the South Caucasus has played an important role and is the shortest land route from China to Europe. The region is a land bridge between Black Sea and the Caspian Sea; and is a gateway to the Middle East and Central Asia. In this light, the South Caucasus has strategic geographical and transportation dimensions.

In the era of industrialization and the world’s economic dependency on oil and gas, the South Caucasus has gained an additional strategic dimension – the energy dimension - specifically for Azerbaijani hydrocarbons’ huge reserves and production. Azerbaijan, at the beginning of XX century, produced more than half of the world's oil production and 95% of Russian oil (11 million tons/per year) (7). And, in nowadays, the South Caucasus is a region neighboring the Persian Gulf. So, the South Caucasus has a multi-dimensional strategic importance both for global and regional powers. Finally, the region’s strategic significance has been brilliantly described by Dr Brzezinski (former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter) in “The Grand Chessboard” (8).

South Caucasus politics' key players  
The contemporary politics of the South Caucasus is characterized by a high level of complexity as well as dynamic rivalry between global, regional and local players. Concerning to the region’s landscape, one can emphasize that the United States, the Islamic world and European countries present global powers; Russia, Turkey and Iran are key regional actors; and finally, as local actors, one can indicate Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. In addition, a huge pool of influential international organizations like OSCE, CIS, EU, NATO, OIC and religious and humanitarian organizations operate and shape politics in this part of the world. Meanwhile, the large family of multi-national oil corporations and companies like BP (UK), Amoco (USA), UNOCAL (USA), McDermott International (USA) and others have their own “pie” in the Caucasus tangle web of oil and politics.

Last, the XXI century’s South Caucasus, like the whole Great Caucasus region, continues to be complex and unassimilated by Russians and occupies a strategic importance for global politics, international security and energy security.

Iran, as mentioned above, is one of the key players in the South Caucasus. And, as within the whole course of history, Iran (Persia) continues to be in the list of powers that struggle for their interests and goals in this region. So, modern Iran has a wide and deep historical experience to play its own strategic game in this part of the world.

Key sources of Iran’s foreign policy

It is necessary to emphasize that Iran (Persia), within the whole course of history, was able to conduct a smart, precise and delicate, balanced and pragmatic foreign policy. As a result of this successful approach, Iran continues to exist in the world map and is now one of the powerful nations. Moreover, Iran is able to adapt an effective foreign and security policy that reflects the changing strategic environments of different historical periods. The centuries of Persian policy’s experience and ability to implement smart policy testify that Iran has fundamental sources that shape the nation’s foreign policy. Concerning the modern Islamic Republic of Iran, the scholars from the RAND Corporation (California-based research organization) emphasize that there are certain characteristics of Iran that drive the country’s foreign and security policy (9).

Since the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the authors urge, there are two key factors -revolutionary Islam and Persian nationalism- which continue to be strong sources for Iran’s foreign policy. However, they argue that the revolutionary or ideological element has declined after more than 20 years since the Islamic Revolution. Such a decline has occurred for several unsuccessful attempts to export and spread the Revolution’s ideas into other parts of the Islamic world, particularly to Central Asia and the South Caucasus. On the other side, according the RAND, the revolutionary ideas brought Iran into confrontation with superpowers and put the country into isolation. So, as many scholars agree, ideas of revolution are declining and, finally, pragmatic, economic and geopolitical factors are raised as driving sources of the country’s foreign policy.

The RAND’s experts consider ethnicity and communalism as the next source of Iran’s foreign policy. They emphasize that some (Azeris, Kurds) ethnic minorities’ close ties with neighboring states, as well as the ethnic communities across the Iranian border,r are a key source for the country’s foreign policy. And we agree with this implication. The Azeris are Iran’s largest ethnic minority. The ethnic composition is: Persians are 51% of the country’s population, Azeris 24%; Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1% (10). Some ethnic groups are concentrated mainly in border areas and have ties with ethnic groups or states across the Iranian border, like Kurds and Azeris. The Azeris have close ties with the South Caucasian Republic of Azerbaijan and Kurds with Kurdish communities in Iraq and Turkey. Moreover, Iranian Azeris have experience in establishing their own independent state (Southern Azerbaijan Democratic Republic) that emerged in 1945-46 with the support of the Soviets (11). Finally, the Azeris minority’s experience in building their own independent state, as well as the existence of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan and Tajikistan (Persian-speaking Central Asian state), have key policy-making implications for Iran’s foreign and security policy towards the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

The next fundamental source for Iran’s foreign policy is economics. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran has faced significant problems in modernizing its national economy and military. Now, both issues occupy a high priority on Tehran’s agenda. Iran needs foreign investments and to diversify the national economy and ensure access to new technologies. However, the isolation of Iran in global affairs, as a result of US-Iranian tensions, creates a huge obstacle for Tehran to deal with economic, military and technological modernization.

Meanwhile, it is necessary to emphasize that the relations between Iran and the United States dominate Iran’s foreign policy and drive and fuel the country’s behavior on global and regional levels. Moreover, the key strategic issue for Iran’s foreign policy is: to solve problems with the West (United States). So, from our viewpoint, Iran conducts foreign policy exactly from the prism of relations with the United States and the West. So, Iran deals with the South Caucasus via an angle of Iran-USA and Iran-Europe relations.

Iran-Russia relations and Iran’s policy toward the region
The South Caucasus is an oil and gas-rich region with a strategic location that creates brilliant prospects for local nations to be rich and prosperous. However, the Caucasus belongs to “the areas of greatest insecurity in today's world lie along an arc from the Balkans through the Middle East to Central Asia” (12). Unfortunately, the South Caucasus is an arena of hard struggle between global and regional powers for geopolitical influence and to control Caspian energy resources, as well as energy transportation routes. And Iran engages into this rivalry.

It is well known that the main threat to Iran’s security and territorial integrity, within the last three centuries, has come from the North – from imperial Russia and later from the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the local states of the South Caucasus - Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia – emerged after the disintegration of the USSR. And now these states form a “buffer zone” between Iran and Russia (13). Iran clearly understands that the existence of such a buffer zone is vital for the nation’s security because of strong Russian imperialistic ambitions and Moscow’s nostalgia for the Red Empire’s “glory” days. So, Iran strongly supports the independence of all three states. On the other hand, the existence of South Caucasian countries creates new opportunities and challenges for Iran’s foreign and security policy.

We consider that Tehran’s strategy toward the South Caucasus originates from Iran’s specific position in global affairs, especially from the nation’s confrontational relations with the West (USA). Iran’s relations with the USA, as a backbone of Tehran’s strategic foreign and security policy, drive and rule Tehran’s behaviour at the global and regional levels, including the South Caucasus. Moreover, some scholars believe that the significant degree of the US-Iranian confrontation is continuing in the South Caucasus as well (14).

It is well known, Iran tries to contain and minimize Western pressure. So, in accordance with this strategy, Tehran actively cooperates with Russia. Notwithstanding with the collapse of the Soviet Empire, modern Russia continues to consider itself as a global competitor to the USA (15). Russia is a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council. And Tehran takes these points into account and considers Moscow as a key supporter. The cooperation between Iran and Russia is highly saturated and covers a wide agenda: science, technology, military and nuclear and other issues with a multi-billion dollar turnover.

Meanwhile, the strategic cooperation with Iran is beneficial for Russia as well. Iran is a huge market for Russia’s military weapons and nuclear technology exports. Since 2005, Russia has had observer status at the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s influence in the Islamic world is an effective tool to create and support Russia’s friendly image in Muslim states. Moreover, by the cooperating with Iran and the OIC, Russia tries to minimize Islamic pressure in Russia itself, as well as in the Caucasus and Central Asia. On the other hand, as a global competitor to the USA, Russia tries (in accordance with the old Soviet strategy) to challenge America’s global positions, particularly in the Islamic world.

Russia very painfully reacts to the U.S. and NATO “advance” into the Kremlin’s “near abroad”, particularly to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia tries to weaken Western influence and presence in this part of the world, as well as to secure Caspian energy resources and energy transportation routes under Moscow’s control.

We can emphasize that Iran has similar strategic goals in the South Caucasus. So, Iran’s South Caucasian strategy is oriented to support Russia’s dominance in this part of the world. It is beneficial for Tehran to be under the Russian umbrella or shadow in this region (16, 17). Both Russia and Iran strengthen their positions in the struggle for influence with the United States, which has proclaimed that the Caspian basin is strategically vital for America’s national interests (18, 19). Moreover, the European Union step-by-step strengthens its positions as well. In other words, the West actively implements a set of strategic programs like - Silk Road Strategy, Partnership for Peace, Eastern Partnership and others, which are oriented to project Western influence to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. These programs are vital to increase the Western presence and redesign the post-Soviet local order, or minimize Russian influence and control. Therefore, Russia needs to react and reflect on challenges that can weaken Russia’s traditional dominance in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Finally, Russia needs to have a strategic partner and Iran is very valuable.

It is necessary to note that Iran’s hostility toward the United States and Israel pushes Tehran to be close to Moscow. Moreover, Russia tries to prolong Iran’s problems with the United States as long as possible. In this case, Russia defocuses Washington’s strategic attention from Russia itself and Russia’s “near abroad” and creates a significant “headache” for Washington’s decision-makers. It is logical that if Russia considers itself as a global competitor for US dominance, Russian strategists believe that US-Iran tension, as well as America’s problems in Iraq, North Korea's issues and the Afghan war would weaken the United States' global dominance and superiority. Finally, the continuation of the US-Iran hostility ensures Iran’s dependency on Moscow and secures Tehran’s billion-dollar flow to the Kremlin that is vital to modernize the old-style Russian economy.

From our perspective, the development of Iran’s foreign policy toward the South Caucasus demonstrates that Tehran abandoned ideological (Islamic or Shia) considerations and adopted pragmatic (supports Russia’s policy) and regional (develops state-to-state relations) approaches toward the South Caucasus. Iran tries to expand its political-security and economic role in the region. Some Iranian scholars believe that “regionalism” could be a beneficial approach in Iran’s foreign policy. They argue that a regional approach will strengthen Iran’s national interest at the regional and international levels and increase Iran’s capacity to deal with great and regional powers (20). Undoubtedly, by developing of bilateral relations with the South Caucasus states, Iran could significantly increase its capabilities in the international scene.

In this light, Iran considers the South Caucasus as a possible and good platform to cooperate with the West. And this is a key strategic dimension of Iran’s foreign policy toward the South Caucasus. Iran tries to participate in huge international projects (with Western participation) to explore and transport Caspian energy resources. However, the United States strongly opposes Iran’s participation it happened with Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century”. The United States excludes any possible cooperation with Tehran for its nuclear ambitions and precisely monitors Iran’s behavior.

Nevertheless, Iran develops economic cooperation with local countries and considers state-to-state relations as a valuable “tool” to increase political influence and strengthen strategic positions. In this light, the cooperation between Iran and Armenia (with Russia’s blessing) is an example of such a strategy. Undoubtedly, Iran-Armenian cooperation has key implications for the South Caucasus and is an effective approach to contain Turkey’s influence, the Turkey-Azerbaijan strategic alliance (21) and rising Azerbaijan’s economic and military power.

Obviously, an improvement of Turkey-Armenian relations will decrease the Tehran-Moscow axis’s role and weaken the axis’s significance for the region. Moreover, an elimination of Turkey-Armenian hostility will dramatically decrease or undermine Russian dominance in the South Caucasus. So, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation does not correlate to Russian (first) and Iranian (second) strategic interests. And indeed, this process is already deadlocked (22). Moreover, Iran tries to contain Turkey, as NATO’s key member and close US ally, in the Greater Middle East region (23) toward which Iran has its own strategic interests and political goals (20).

Notwithstanding Iran has wide historical heritage to deal with the South Caucasus, however, Tehran’s capabilities are significantly limited. Iran, unlike Turkey, is not so attractive for the South Caucasian countries because of Tehran’s tensions with the USA. This is the first and key point. Both Azerbaijan and Georgia, unlike Armenia, consider the West (USA) as a key source to secure their independence and counterbalance the predominant Russian power. Second, the Islamic nature of Tehran’s regime significantly limits the political co-operation; and the third point - Russia! The elimination of Iran-US tensions or any significant improvement does not correlate with Russia’s long-term interests.

Finally, the strategic approach of Iran’s foreign policy toward the South Caucasus is more pragmatic than ideological or based on ethnicity and is oriented to prevent any significant shifts which could strengthen positions of the United States or European Union or NATO; support Russian dominance; and keep a balance between local states.

Region’s political dynamics and Iran’s strategic priorities
Since the Soviet Union’s breakup, we have identified two significant shifts in the geopolitical game of the South Caucasus. The first is: - Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century” of 1995; and - second, the Russo-Georgian war that broke out in August 2008. From our viewpoint, the first shift led to the second and, so, the event’s consequence indicates that the Russo-Georgian war was unavoidable.

Azerbaijan’s “Contract of the Century” has opened doors for large-scale Western penetration and investments not only into Azerbaijani oil and gas sectors, but to the whole South Caucasian region. And investments brought wide and active political engagement of the West into Caucasian affairs. The United States, NATO, the European Union and Turkey began step-by-step to strengthen their positions and gradually started to implement several strategic programs like: Silk Road Strategy, Partnership for Pease, Eastern Partnership and strengthening Turkic identity. These programs and the set of initiatives like Caspian Guard (24) are oriented to establish pro-Western security arrangements and ensure Western (US) interest and direct control over Caspian energy resources and energy’s transportation routes.

Undoubtedly, Iran considers such initiatives as a direct threat to its security. Moreover, Iran was the first (possibly with Russian approval) who try to overthrow the situation and stop Western “advance” into the region in which Russia and Iran are traditional players and have common strategic goals.

So, Iran’s reaction was very clear and aggressive, like it happened in 2001 when an Iranian warship forced a British Petroleum boat to return to port, or Iranian military aircraft violated Azerbaijani air borders and entered the country’s airspace (25). Moreover, only the diplomatic intervention of Ankara and Washington prevented a full-scale war (26). These events emphasize that Tehran was very angry with Azerbaijan and Georgian pro-Western orientation and for rising influence of the United States in the whole Caspian basin.

It is necessary to note that Russia, in that time, was engaged to solve the unrest in Chechnya. And, possibly for Chechen issues, Moscow or Tehran-Moscow axis was unable to stop or at list to slow down Western “advance”.

Finally, within the next years, the West was able significantly to increase its presence in the South Caucasus. Moreover, Georgia directly and Azerbaijan indirectly began to speculate on future NATO membership. It was a time of “good hope” for local states to solve their security issues.

So, within the years after the “Contract of the Century”, Russia gradually being forced to retreat from the South Caucasus and Central Asia. And Moscow very painfully reacted for Western and Asian advances to these regions. Some experts emphasize that: “... to counter this development, one of Russia’s tactics is to slow down Western advances... ” (36). So, possibly that the origin of the Russo-Georgian war, from our viewpoint, comes from this strategy. And Moscow’s strategic goal were clear: to stop Russia’s retreat and retake strategic initiative and ensure Russia’s interests. Unfortunately, Georgia’s President Saakashvili’s miscalculations have provided an opportunity to shift the balance of power and strengthen Moscow’s security posture in the region.

Finally, we have second significant shift and new or current the region’s security pattern that has been emerged as result of the Russo-Georgian war. Russia, as result of the war, was able significantly to strengthen its position and influence. Moreover, Russia demonstrated to global and regional powers that the South Caucasus (like a whole CIS) is Russian “near abroad” and Moscow has exclusive rights to use the force and manage the situation in accordance with Russia’s interests. The war provided to Russia a brilliant opportunity to retake strategic initiative and enforce Moscow's strategic position in its immediate neighborhood. And now, Georgian and Ukrainian movement toward NATO membership is abandoned from the agenda. Some scholars directly emphasize: “Western actors have in practice been forced to recognize Russia’s military dominance in the region and act only in areas approved by Russia and within the limits set by Russia” (27).

As logical continuation of the current strategic opportunity, Russia (two years later) extends the lease of military base in Armenia through 2044 (28). This is next significant Russia’s step to utilitize success after the war with Georgia and, so, to strengthen its positions in the region.

Iran, which is against any Western military presence in the region, did not express any statements against Russia’s extension to lease a base. So, Tehran’s silence means an approval for such developments.

Meanwhile, Russia accelerates its role to negotiate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (29). Obviously, Russia is capitalizing its advantages, coming as result of Russo-Georgian war and tries to arrange pro-Russian security order. Finally, we can state that now the pendulum is on the Tehran-Moscow axis’ side.

However, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last visits to the South Caucasus ensures the United States engagement to the ongoing hard rivalry in this strategic part of the world (30, 31).

Undoubtedly, Russia’s strong positions mean that neither the USA nor NATO will able to deploy military bases in close vicinity of the Iranian border. The continuation of Russian dominance, therefore, has a strategic significance for Iran’s foreign and security policy and is beneficial for both Tehran and Moscow because of their close strategic priorities in the South Caucasus:
- Counter and reduce US influence;
- Opposes US, NATO and EU current and long-term objectives;
- Contain EU influence and oppose to EU’s strategic initiatives;
- Prevent the deployment of US or NATO military bases;
- Oppose Israeli cooperation with Georgia and Azerbaijan;
- Stop Georgian and Azerbaijani drift toward NATO/EU membership;
- Arrange security order in accordance with Iran’s (and Russia’s) strategic interests;
- Ensure control over Caspian energy resources and their transportation routes;
- Contain rising influence of Turkey and Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance;
- Prolong Turkey-Armenia hostility;
- Oppose to the long-term strategic cooperation in Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan triangle;
- Keep strategic balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia and so, contain Azerbaijan’s rise to regional power;
- Support Russia’s leading role in Caucasian and Caspian affairs and so, ensure current "status-quo"

Finally, it is beneficial for Iran to keep status-quo and support Russian dominance. Iran, in this case, is able to ensure its paramount strategic goal: to limit or decrease U.S. influence and, so, to prevent America’s attempts to redesign the region’s political landscape and secure Washington’s dominance.

Iran’s bilateral relations with local countries
It is necessary to note that bilateral relations with the South Caucasus sates are a priority line in Iran’s foreign policy to deal with border countries. The cooperation with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia is powerful tool to strengthen Iran’s influence and political significance for local and global actors. The bilateral relation’s expansion could partially compensate Iran’s limited capacity, originates from Tehran’s regime nature, to participate in huge international projects that are currently implemented in the South Caucasus and Caspian basin as well. Moreover, Iran considers state-to-state relations as an effective approach to keep strategic balance between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.

Within the last decade, Azerbaijan was able to increase its political, economic and military mighty and now “the balance of power in the region shifted in favour of Azerbaijan” (32). Moreover, some European scholars argue to consider Azerbaijan as a key country in the region and call to focus or recalibrate EU policy on Azerbaijan instead of Georgia (32).

Undoubtedly, Iran clearly understands Azerbaijan’s strategic importance and tries to keep “on track” the dialogue with Baku. Tehran significantly intensifies high-level contacts and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad several times paid official visits to Baku to discuss the region’s agenda.

Azerbaijan’s raising power and its long-term cooperation with the USA/EU and Israel is a great concern for Iran. Some experts argue that Iran prefers to see Azerbaijan remain involved in the conflict with Armenia. In this case, as scholars believe, Azerbaijan will be “unattractive for Iran’s Azerbaijanis and unable to allocate resources to stir-up “South Azerbaijan” (33). Iran supports Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, but provides large scale economic assistance to Armenia. Interestingly, Iran, as Shia state, implements so called “double track” policy toward the Republic of Azerbaijan (87% are Shi'a Moslems). Tehran, possibly, considers the “double track” policy as an effective approach to contain the Republic of Azerbaijan which is becoming a new regional power. Moreover, Iran’s decision-makers suppose that Azerbaijan’s involvement in the conflict with Armenia is effective to contain Turkey and Turkey-Azerbaijan strategic alliance that covers energy, transportation, economic, political and military issues.

Meantime, the prolongation of Turkish-Armenian hostility is an important element in Tehran’s calculations to keep Ankara under pressure and limit the projection of Turkish power on the South Caucasus and Central Asia. From other side, the Turkish-Armenian hostility increases Tehran’s strategic significance for Armenia and Russia.

Finally, Iran is capitalizing political and economic advantages from the current deadlock situation in relations between Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance and Armenia. The main economic benefits are: - to keep Iran as a valuable exporter for Armenian market; and - vital transportation route that links Armenia with Iran's Persian Gulf ports.

Meantime, political advantages are huge: - to counterbalance Azerbaijan's alliance with Turkey; - to reorganize Tehran’s image and facilitate a US-Iran rapprochement via Armenian Diaspora’s assistance. And this point is a key strategic element for Tehran to keep relation with Erevan on track.

Georgia, it is necessary to note that Iran kept silence at the Russo-Georgia war of 2008. Some scholars consider that “behind Iran's official silence is a combination of factors. These range from Iran's common cause with Moscow against expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), interpreting this crisis as a major setback for NATO's "eastward expansion" in light of the unabashed pro-West predilections of Tbilisi's government, to Iran's sensitivity to Russia's national security concerns” (34). Notwithstanding Iranian position in Georgia’s crisis, the Iran-Georgia relations are now under fast development. So, according to Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister, Nino Kalandadze: “Our relations have entered a new phase”. And on the joint news conference in Tbilisi on 27 May 2010, the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry’s Spokesman, Ramin Mehmanparast (with deputy minister’s rank) added that Georgia and Iran intend to resume direct airline flights, cancel visa requirements for travelers, open an Iranian consulate in Batumi. Moreover, as he has mentioned, the Iranian side “unconditionally supports Georgia’s territorial integrity” (35).

The same position Iran expresses on Azerbaijan territorial integrity. Baku and Erevan feel some mistrust toward Tehran because of Iran has huge Azeri population but supports Armenia. However, Tehran tried to mediate a peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan (13). Finally, Iran is playing its own game in a classic Persian style: to balance between rivals and secure its own interests.

Conclusions
As the world’s oil and gas dependency is rising, so the safe and regular energy supplies will continue to occupy a high priority in world powers’ strategic agenda. In this light, the export of Caspian energy, it is well-known, is an alternative to the Persian Gulf energy. Within the last 15 years, the West has invested billion dollars to explore, develop and transport Caspian energy bypass Russia, which tries to be only one hub to supply oil and gas from the post-Soviet area to the world market.

 The Clinton administration and the George W.Bush administration have launched several strategic programs and initiatives oriented to project and secure Western presence and so, to ensure stable energy supplies from the South Caucasus. Unfortunately, the Obama administration does not pay significant attention to the South Caucasus. And the lack of Washington’s attention is beneficial for Iran and Russia but dangerous for America’s stakes in the region. The decline of Washington’s strategic attention creates an opportunity for Tehran-Moscow axis gradually to push out the USA from the region and regain a full control over Caspian resources.

The continuation of US-Iran tensions means that Iran will continue to be oriented on Russia. And Iran will support Russia’s strategy to keep region’s “frozen conflicts” active. Because, it is better to keep local conflicts unresolved and wait for the further opportunity to establish finally pro-Russian-Iranian order than to allow the United States to solve the conflicts and create pro-Western security order.

From other hand, Tehran’s decision-makers clearly understand that the insecurity in the South Caucasus threats to Iran. So, Iran will try to escape any involvement into “frozen conflicts” and minimize or eliminate any threat of conflicts in the Central Asia. The continuation of insecurity in the South Caucasus could directly affect to Iran’s internal politics. Moreover, the military operations in the close vicinity of Iranian borders represent a serious threat to Iran’s security. If a new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia will break out, so the behavior of huge Iran’s Azeri population will unpredictable. In addition, it will unclear the possible reaction of Iran’s Azeris regarding the current Tehran’s regime which could fall.

"We are very concerned about security in the Caucasus region, it is a rather sensitive topic for Tehran, so we are ready to take part in solving the problematic issues in the region," said Iranian Foreign Minister Monuchehr Mottaki in Tbilisi at a joint press conference with Foreign Minister of Georgia Grigol Vashadze (38).

However, we can see that Iran’s foreign policy toward the South Caucasus has a strategic dilemma: to keep status quo and, so, to counter Western influence; or to facilitate the settlement of conflicts and secure peace and stability along Iranian borders.

Undoubtedly, a stabilized South Caucasus would be an optimal environment to ensure the Caspian energy’s stable supply to Western markets. And the United States has great stake in the region and Caspian oil business that obligate Washington to secure peace and stability in the region.

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