02 March, 2017
Original:
Khalifa-zadeh Mahir, "Great Britain's Foreign Policy And Iran's Nuclear Program", Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal, 2006, Vol. 2 (38), 61-67, https://ca-c.org/CAC/index.php/cac/article/view/895
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Introduction
Starting
from the beginning of the 1990s, the United States kept Iran’s nuclear
research in the focus. It is well-known that Washington claims Iran that,
under the cover of a national peaceful nuclear energy program, Tehran moves
fast to create its nuclear weapon. As early as 1996, in response to the growing
suspicions about the existence of such a program in Iran, the U.S. Congress adopted the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act that envisages introducing harsh
measures against foreign companies that are investing more than 20 million
dollars in Iran’s energy sector. But after the terrorist attack on the United
States in September 2001 and Iran’s blacklisting as a country sponsoring
terrorism, the White House toughened up its policy against Tehran even more,
striving to put a complete stop to research under its nuclear program. In this
respect, based on the fact that Great Britain is the U.S.’s key ally in its
global policy, it is expedient to take a look at official London’s foreign
policy approaches both toward Tehran’s nuclear program and toward Iran on the
whole.
The
Beginning of Iran’s Atomic Researches
Iran’s
political elite began thinking about organizing research in this sphere back
during the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. This pragmatic head of state set
about targeted modernization of the country, acquired modern technology, and
created new branches of industry, that is, he steered a course toward forming
Iran’s industrial, technological, and intellectual might. For example, as early
as 1959, he acquired a 5-megawatt reactor from the United States to carry out his first research work on nuclear energy. The Shah essentially planned to
build 23 atomic power plants before 1990. However according to experts from the
Congressional Research Service, there is no evidence supporting the fact that
Iran began creating its own nuclear weapons as early as the reign of the Shah
(1).
After
the end of the Iranian-Iraqi war of 1980-1988, Tehran renewed its work on the
nuclear program on the initiative of the country’s president, Hashemi
Rafsanjani, whom the U.S. believes to be the father of the Iranian nuclear
armament program. In particular, it insisted on Germany’s Kraftwerke Union
A.G., a joint Siemens and Telefunken venture, completing the construction of an
atomic power plant in Bushehr, which began under the shah in 1974. It should be
noted that the planned capacity of its two reactors was 1,200 megawatts each,
and the total cost of the contract with this German company amounted to 4-6
billion dollars.2 But under powerful pressure from the U.S., which suspected
Iran of carrying out secret work to create its own nuclear weapons, the German
company refused to renew the contract. Based on this, in January 1995, the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran signed a document with the Russian
Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy on the completion by the Russian side of
startup-setup operations at the atomic power plant in Bushehr.
In
2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran provided information that the
country’s leadership was organizing secret work in the atomic sphere at the
Natanz underground nuclear center, a factory for the enrichment of uranium. In 2004, a scandal broke out relating to the fact that in 1980-1990, Pakistani
physicist Abdul Kadir Khan was providing Iran with information on enriching
uranium and other materials for research in the atomic sphere. At that time
(2004), Tehran announced its plans to build several atomic power
plants in the next 20 years, the total capacity of which would amount to as
much as 6,000 MW. What is more, the country’s administration repeatedly stated
that it was not conducting research to create nuclear weapons (3). However the
United States continued to maintain that Iran was carrying out this work and
demanded that it be prohibited.
London’s Approach to Tehran
It
should be noted that British experts view the United Kingdom’s policy toward
Iran in the context of the country’s overall strategy in the Middle East. In recent decades, according to specialists, British policy is functioning as a
bridge between the United States and the European Union, which is naturally
having an effect on London’s relations with Middle Eastern countries. The
same experts are critical of this strategy and believe that Great Britain
should be mainly oriented toward Europe and consequently act on the
international arena as a member of the European Union (4). Incidentally, it is
noted that Great Britain essentially has the same interests as the other
Western states in Iran and the other Middle Eastern countries: ensuring
continuous deliveries of oil to their markets; fighting radical political
forces and intercepting threats posed by them both to regional stability and to
stability in Great Britain itself; fighting terrorism; and preventing the
spread of weapons of mass destruction and their components. What is more,
according to British experts, Great Britain has significant commercial
interests in the region relating to the sale of state-of-the-art weapons
systems to its countries. However, in accordance with mid- and longer-term
prospects, the significance of this factor in official London’s policy will
most likely decline.
On
the whole though, concerning Iran and other Middle Eastern countries,
British experts note two approaches in the United Kingdom’s policy—diplomatic
and strategic (5). The diplomatic approach is aimed at maintaining good
relations with the current regimes, as well as with the political forces that
could potentially come to power, thus making it possible to avoid a possible
confrontation with them in the future. This approach, like the need to carry
out a policy-oriented more toward Europe, has many supporters in the Foreign
Office and in the leftist wing of the Labor Party and Liberal Democrats. The aggressive
anti-Western governments of the region’s countries are viewed as such, and
consequently, in relations with them, a policy of containment is recommended.
Both this approach and the pro-American foreign policy of the United Kingdom as
a whole are supported by the Prime Minister’s administration and in certain
circles of the Labor and Conservative parties. As directly concerns Iran’s
nuclear program, Great Britain’s political community believes that
this country needs nuclear energy to meet its growing energy needs, in
particular, to preserve its non-renewable resources of oil and gas, that is, the
main commodities of Iranian export. But, according to British experts, the
question nevertheless arises of why a country with the richest supplies of oil
and natural gas in the world is stubbornly developing a nuclear program, the
goal of which, as it states, is to meet its energy needs (6).
Key Trends
In
contrast to the United States, Great Britain had rather good relations
with Iran at one time, even though the U.K. tended strongly toward America in
its foreign policy. For example, in the mid-1990s, London supported the
conception put forward by the European Union of establishing a “critical
dialog” with Tehran on its nuclear program. In 2002-2003, British Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (colloquially called the Foreign
Secretary) Jack Straw made several visits to Tehran, during which he
characterized Iran’s political regime as a nascent democracy. What is more,
Jack Straw underlined the presence of good bilateral cooperation and called for
a constructive approach in this sphere. In other words, London’s relatively
“soft” approach toward Tehran contrasted sharply with Washington’s hard-line
policy in this area (4).
This
“softness” could have been caused by the fact that recently, particularly since
the beginning of the joint military operation with the U.S. in Iraq, people in
Great Britain have begun increasingly expressing their displeasure with the
leadership’s unconditional support of the United States’ foreign policy steps.
In particular, Jeremy Corbyn, a Labor MP from the House of Commons, sent the
heads of the parliamentary house a written inquiry asking them to “declare some
independence in our foreign policy rather than following George Bush from war
to war.” The Guardian published an editorial article at the same time in which
Tony Blair was blamed for the deterioration in relations between Iran and Great
Britain. As for the above-mentioned inquiry, British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw reiterated that the U.K. government still disagrees with the U.S. hostile
policy toward Iran despite its closeness with the Bush Administration (7). Some
experts noted that Great Britain even asked the United States to leave Iran
alone. On this account, Jack Straw noted that his country would not interfere
in Iran’s internal affairs, emphasizing that official London’s policy in this
area differs from the American and warned Washington from interfering in Iran’s
internal affairs, explaining that the Iranians should sort out their domestic
policy problems themselves (8).
In
September 2003, a discussion was held in the British parliament regarding
London’s policy towards Tehran, during which Sir Teddy Taylor (a Conservative
Member of the House of Commons) said that it was a “huge error” to have
negative relations with Iran. “Iran,” he said, “is one of the most sensible
countries in the Middle East.” In response to this statement, Foreign Office
Minister Chris Mullin “decoded” official London’s foreign political approach
toward Tehran, including toward its nuclear program. For example, according to
the Foreign Office Minister, there is no doubt that Iran is a country of
growing international importance, and he described the British government’s
policy toward Iran as pursuing a “constructive and when necessary critical
engagement.” He cited cooperation in such areas as the fight against drugs, the
restoration of Afghanistan, and efforts to stabilize Iraq. What is more,
Chris Mullin said that the United Kingdom supported Khatami’s reformist regime
aimed at building a civil society based upon the rule of law. But he added that
it would be wrong not to set out concerns about Iran, specifying there were
worries about human rights, support for terrorist groups, the development of
weapons of mass destruction, and Iran’s nuclear program. What is more, the
Foreign Office representative denied that Tony Blair’s government was divided
over the U.K.’s policy toward Iran (9).
Official
London’s distancing from Washington’s approaches to Tehran and its nuclear
program was also discussed in November 2004, when British Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw, talking about the United States’ possible military campaign against
Iran, stressed that he could not imagine any circumstances “which would justify
military measures against Iran. The United Kingdom would not support such a
policy if there ever were such a policy.”10 It is very likely that these words
were also prompted by the severe criticism in the country of the activity of
Tony Blair’s cabinet due to his “attachment” to U. S. policy, that is, the
Foreign Office wanted to demonstrate again its independence from Washington.
What is more, it is possible that in this way, the British Foreign Office was
trying to emphasize not only its independence but also its particular
orientation toward Europe. We will remind you that at that time the European
capitals, primarily Paris and Berlin, criticized the American and British
military operation in Iraq, as well as America’s approach toward Iran’s nuclear
program and toward official Tehran on the whole. Consequently, it is entirely
possible that Great Britain was also showing its particular orientation toward
Europe in its participation in the work of the so-called Troika (EU3) which is
holding talks on behalf of the European Union with Iran regarding the halting
of its nuclear program. This evaluation of London’s policy is perhaps also
confirmed by the fact that as early as June 2003, former British Secretary of
State Robin Cook, when characterizing London’s approach toward Tehran, said
that the blind hate of the American administration headed by George Bush for
Iran has weakened the reformers and done the religious conservatives a favor.
British policy toward Iran should be aimed at supporting the reformers headed
by Khatami. This will be both in our interests and in the interests of the
Iranians. This time we should make the White House understand that we do not
intend to subordinate the interests of the British nation to the interests of
the United States, which is oriented toward a policy of confrontation. Iran
cannot become another Iraq (11).
After
a representative of the conservative wing of its political elite, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, came to power in Iran as a result of the presidential election in
June 2005, as well as with respect to the decisions of the IRI government in
January 2006 to remove the IAEA seals from some of the uranium enriching
equipment at the Natanz nuclear center in effect since 2004 and since
modernization of this center began, a tendency toward rapprochement with
Washington’s hard line has been designated in official London’s approaches
toward Tehran. What is more, it is possible that the victory of a hard-line
supporter at the presidential election in Iran meant that the West’s hopes for the evolution of the political regime in Tehran were crushed to a certain extent.
For example, in an information broadcast by the BBC in January 2005, it was
noted that while the U.S. is stubbornly insisting on discussion of the
sanctions against Iran at the U.N. Security Council meetings, and is even threatening
it with a military campaign, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw spoke out in
support of a carefully considered approach, saying that there is no need to
hastily introduce such sanctions.12 What is more, according to the results of
the talks held in Washington, also in January 2005, Jack Straw said that
although the U.S. supports the idea of carrying out a military
campaign against Iran, this question was not even discussed during these talks.
Here it is pertinent to note that at this time the Foreign Office prepared a
200-page report, which reviewed the possible actions of the U.S. and EU with
respect to Iran’s nuclear program, in particular, those rejecting any military
campaign against official Tehran and recommending establishing talks with it
(13).
But
the severe statements of the new Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
addressed to Israel, the U.S., and the West as a whole, in our opinion,
essentially buried any hopes, at least for some time, of softening the
political regime in Tehran, which also led to a toughening up of London’s
policy. In this respect, it should be noted that possibly to provoke a domestic political struggle in Iran and to strengthen the
opposition to its current regime, in October 2005, more than 50% of the members
of the House of Commons asked the British government to conduct a more adequate
policy toward the clerical authorities of this country. In particular, a press
release of the British Parliamentary Committee for Iran Freedom prepared on 13
December 2005 regarding this initiative, noted the need to remove the terror
label from the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran
(PMOI), and the restrictions on its activity in Great Britain (14).
This
initiative was also supported by the House of Lords, which came forward with a
corresponding address to the government on 31 January, 2006.15 (We will note
that before the 1979 revolution, Mojahedin-e Khalq conducted an anti-Western
policy. But after Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi was forced to leave the country, it
began organizing terrorist acts against the clerical regime in Iran (16).
In
this way, according to British experts from the Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI), after the revival by the new IRI political leadership of work at the Natanz
Center, Tony Blair’s government decided to use “more stick and less carrot”
in its relations with Iran. For example, during the debate on the Iranian
nuclear program held in the British parliament in October 2005, the Foreign Office’s
Middle East Minister Kim Howells responded to calls from members of parliament
for a tougher policy toward Iran with a cryptic message suggesting that “the
government is no longer quite as certain that it will never strike Iran’s
nuclear facilities” (17).
Nevertheless,
at the meeting held in London of members of the U.N. Security Council and
Germany on 31 January 2006, an agreement was reached to submit Iran’s nuclear
dossier to the U.N. Security Council for review, taking into account Russia’s
proposal to put off any action by the Security Council until March of this
year.18 And on the outcome of this meeting, British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw announced that the U.N. Security Council would not take any measures
until March when the IAEA was due to present it with a detailed report on
Iran.
According
to the British newspaper The Guardian, the U.N. Security Council could adopt a
resolution envisaging extremely serious measures—from the application of
sanctions to the use of force against Iran. But, the newspaper believes, it is
very likely that the Security Council will propose that the IAEA continue
monitoring Tehran’s nuclear program while simultaneously demanding that it stop
work on its uranium enrichment activities and proposing that talks be renewed
(19).
Conclusions
According
to the British newspaper Financial Times, Iran’s nuclear policy is supported by
ultra-conservative Ali Khamenei, who is the highest official making decisions
on this program (20), and official Tehran needs nuclear potential to achieve
its far-reaching and broad-ranged strategic interests.
In
this respect, it can be presumed that Iran will continue steering its current
course: skillfully maneuvering, playing for time, and balancing, in so doing,
on the differences in strategic interests among the U.S., EU, Russian
Federation, China, and the Islamic world. No doubt possessing its
own nuclear potential will raise Iran to an entirely different level of
regional and global policy. Consequently, it will look for new opportunities to
continue work on its nuclear program, in which it has already invested billions
of dollars.
According
to the Israeli newspaper The Jerusalem Post,21 in the next 1.5-2 years, Iran
will create its own atomic bomb, although officially it will deny this, stating
that it has no such intentions. At the same time, Tehran announced its plans to
build seven atomic power plants before 2025 (22).
As
for Great Britain’s further relations with Iran, including concerning
Tehran’s nuclear program, it is possible that despite its close relations with
Washington, London will keep a certain distance from the U.S. However the United States and Great Britain may exert maximum efforts to
activate the opposition functioning in Iran and to support the immigrant
circles acting outside the country against the regime inside it.
*Dr Mahir
Khalifa-zadeh is a political scientist and coworker at the International Academy of
Ecological Energy, (Baku, Azerbaijan)
Reference:
2-A. Ommani, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Iran and Iran’s Nuclear Program,” American-Iranian Friendship Committee, 20 June, 2005 [www.swans.com]; A. Koch, J. Wolf, Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: a Profile, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998; “Iran’s Nuclear Program”, http://irans-nuclear-program.brainsip.com
3-“Iran Denies It’s Building Nuclear Bomb,” Associated Press, 7 August, 2003; Statement by Mr. G. Ali Khoshroo, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, Second Session of the Prepcom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 29 April, 2003.
4- J. Rynhold, “British Policy Toward the Middle East,” BESA Perspectives, No. 11, 7 November, 2005, www.biu.ac.il
5- Abidem
6- “Campaign For Nuclear Disarmament, Iran and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” July 2003, CND Briefing, London, www.cnduk.org
7- “Straw Reiterates U.K. Disagreement with U.S. Policy toward Iran,” Payvand’s Iran News, 9 September, 2003, www.payvand.com/news/03/sep/1048.html
8- News, 17 June, 2003, www.lenta.ru
9- “U.K. Denies Divided Policy on Iran,” IRNA, 18 September, 2003 [www.globalsecurity.org]
10- P. Schwarz, “Europe Alarmed by U.S. Threats against Iran,” 25 January, 2005, World Socialist Web Site, www.wsws.org
11- “Robin Cook: So where are the Weapons?” El Pais (Spain), 6 June, 2003, http://www.inosmi.ru/print/ 183096.html
12- BBC News, 25 January, 2006
13- “U.S.: British Foreign Secretary Says U.S. Committed To Diplomatic Approach Toward Iran,” Radio Free Europe Liberty, 25 January, 2005, www.rferl.org
14- “The British Parliamentary Committee for Iran Freedom,” Press Release, 13 December, 2005, www.ncriran. org
15- “Iran: UK Parliamentarians, Jurists Call for De-proscription of PMOI,” 31 January, 2006, www.ncr-iran.org
16- Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization. Country Report on Terrorism. United States Department of State, April 2005
17- “Blair’s New Tune on Iran,” Iran Focus, 22 October, 2005, www.iranfocus.com
18- This article was submitted to the editorial board at the end of February 2006
19- “Iran Nuclear Crisis Sent to Security Council,” The Guardian, 1 February, 2006
20- “Crude Calculation: Why Oil-Rich Iran Believes the West Will Yield to Nuclear Brinkmanship,” Financial Times, 2 February, 2006
21- “Putin’s Plan for Conflict with Iran,” The Jerusalem Post, 31 January, 2006, www.jpost.com
22- Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 23 November, 2005.
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